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Why I arn (still) a sociocomputationalist 
and why you should be, too! 
William Frawley 
George Washington University 
I am flattered by the selection of my 1997 book for debate in this presti- 
gious journal, and I am grateful to the editors for devising such a useful, ongoing 
conversation about questions that many of us take to be the driving ideas of our ~ 
intellectual work: 
What is thinking? 
How does thinking relate to language and the social world? 
Does history matter to thinking or to explanations of thinking? 
How can we connect the latest models of thinking and language with the 
valuable insights of those on whom we build our theories, even those with whom 
+ve disagree ? 
A confident answer to any one of those questions -or even a part of one of 
these questions- should keep us all happy for the rest of our lives. But I am even 
more hwnbled by the fact that I am familiar with the efforts of a number of the 
commentators to answer questions such as the foregoing, and my great respect 
for their views tempers further my partia1 answers to our shared paradigmatic 
questions. 
Responding to the commentators, however, poses an enormously difficult 
task. To reach back to them in the ways they have thoughtfully engaged my book 
is simply not possible because of the amount of time that has elapsed between I 
now and the appearance of the English version of Vygotsky and Cognitive 
Science (which was completed, for all intents and purposes, in 1995). In the near 
decade since, computationalism has changed, Vygotskyanism has changed, I 1 
have changed, and, I would guess, even in the two years since these initial com- 
mentaries, the views of the commentators have changed. To do the whole context 
justice, I would have to engage each commentator one by one and update their 
arguments and mine. In other words, I would have to write the next book! 
So I have had to circumscribe my response. Let me say as a way to begin 
that Gabucio's summary of my book is excellent: it is accurate and thorough. 
Among the comentaries, there are some authors with whom I think I see pretty 
much eye to eye: Dorningo and Igoa, e.g. There are others whose arguments I 
understand, but simply disagree with -hopefully not irreconcilably: Rosa, e.g . 
For many others, I am grateful for their corrections. I am especially thankful to 
those who pointed out translation errors. I did not see the final Spanish version 
before publication and so was unable to exercise any editorial control over the 
style and accuracy of the translation. And yet there are others whose arguments 
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partly remain mysterious to me -some of what Vera says, e.g., escapes me even 
after numerous readings. To invoke Wittgenstein, I pass over them in silence. 
I have organized my response into two sets of issues: 
those that clarify my argument and have caused commentary, consensus, 
repartee, and genuine distress. 
those that point beyond the 1997 book to what, in my view, would be a pro- 
ductive, future Vygotskyan cognitive science. 
Clarification of the argument 
While some commentators have occasionally accused me of secretly hol- 
ding a defective expansionist theory, in truth I had a quite limited purpose in Vy- 
gotsky and Cognitive Science. I sought to explain the place of (what I understand 
to be) the core of classical Vygotskyanism in classical computationalism. My ar- 
gument was that social speech goes underground in the service of metathought in 
problem solving as individuals establish identities by differentiating from the ex- 
ternal social world (classical Vygotsky), and this speech has a computable forn 
and function in the control mechanisms of the mental-computational architecture 
(classical computation). Because of this convergence between inner social speech 
and computational control, computationalism and Vygotskyanism can be mutually 
informative. I called this whole effort socio-computationalism. In retrospect, my 
mathematical side, pressing me to say precisely and only what I mean, insists that 
I should have labeled the idea historico-socio-cognitive-executive-mechanistic- 
computationalism. This is a wonderfully accurate t e m  that cannot be uttered! 
In spite of -and because of- the comentaries on my proposal, I remain 
certain that this view is correct. In fact, I am even more convinced that anyone 
who believes in social mind (as I do) cannot avoid embracing this view as well 
as other computationally tractable varieties of social mind. 
Computationalism 
When it comes to mind, there is only computation. The concept of com- 
putation is neither a vague metaphor awaiting materialistic rephrasing nor an ex- 
treme reductionistic view. Mind is computation. There are no mental processes 
that are not in some form computable, and processes that are not computable 
cannot be candidates for mental explanation. I once heard a colleague offer the 
following explanation for why adult second-language learners reach limited 
competency: the learners simply decide to stop learning because they see that 
what they have learned is enough for them to get along. Fair enough! But how do 
they do that? Phrased in the way it was, such a statement is not a claim about 
thinking, but about phenomenology. To be responsible mind theorists, we must 
ask, <<What mechanisms make this a way to talk about the decision and beha- 
vior?>>. The answers to this must yield computable (in principle) mechanistic 
descriptions +ven for the fuzziest and squishiest things, like beliefs, feelings, 
desires, selves, and so on. 
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A popular materialist apothegm to which I adhere goes: No matter? Never 
mind! I would add, No execution offunctions over representational states? Ne- 
ver historico-socio-cognitive-executive-mechanistic-computationalism! For me 
-and, I would dare to assert, for you- computation is the only way to explain 
mind. Domingo, Igoa, Rosa, Vera, and Madruga must all be either pleased or an- 
gered by this claim. What does it mean? 
Suppose that you believe that a thought is like a fossil and is explained 
only by reference to history, as Lacasa argues. By history, I gather we mean so- 
mething like <<events linked in time with significance to someone>>, not just 
things that happen. For events linked in time with significance to someone to 
have a role in mind, the significance must be translated into something that can 
be taken up by a mind in its actual decision processes. Or, as I said in Vygotsky 
and Cognitive Science, the external world must have a representational landing 
site in a thinking device. Thus, situated cognition is not a theory of cognition in 
any way, shape, or form, unless the situated information is cognized. This seems 
to me so obvious as to be axiomatic. 
Imagine that a culture's history of solving problems in certain ways is so- 
mehow indexed in the culture's language -e.g., in lexical meanings or, more li- 
kely, in the meanings of certain grammatical functors at the boundary between 
discourse and syntax. What would it be for such an intrinsically historical claim 
to be tenable or even testable -beyond a metaphor itself- as a claim about thin- 
king? There would have to be a way for this cultural history to inflect individual 
mind in actual instances of operation. That is, these forms in their historical se- 
mantic richness would have to be demonstrated to evoke the historical facts and 
actually be used by minds in problem-solving tasks. If history is in mind, it has 
to be run on a mind. But if history remains externa1 to mind, it may be an inte- 
resting and useful set of facts to inventory and investigate, but these facts would 
be best described and explained by anthropology, sociology, journalism, or wha- 
tever, not mind theory. We must be careful to make a distinction between history 
merely having some bearing on mind and history entering into the explanation of 
mind. For the latter, it must be computable. 
I believe that mind is historical, as Vygotksy did. That is, I believe that 
mind is a fossil and that any purely synchronic, surgically removed piece of 
mind cannot be fully understood except in terms of its history (which is why I 
think that evolutionary psychology has some useful convergences with new Vy- 
gotskyanism: see below). But I also believe that unless we demonstrate how and 
where history appears in mind, we have made an empty claim by saying all be- 
havior is the history of behavior. All physics is the history of physics, too, in 
some sense. 
A proper understanding of the role of history in thinking allows Vygotsky 
and cognitive science to sharpen each other. When you explain a thought pro- 
cess, your account must be tempered with a historical claim. For exarnple, is the 
likelihood of retrieval of certain lexical memories a probabilistic function of past 
retrievals or past activations? Obviously, yes, for some lexical forns: this is the 
essence of connectionism. Is the likelihood of retrieved episodic memories a 
function of the individual's position in the externa1 episode as retrieved over 
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time, or of the way that the culture has organized those episodes, perhaps in lan- 
guage? I have no idea, but this would be an intriguing idea to test, especially if 
language somehow indexes episodes for retrieval. Consider some evidence. Ac- 
cording to Schrauf (cited in Carruthers 2002), it is easier for bilinguals to cons- 
truct a memory in the language they would have been using at the time of the epi- 
sode to be recalled than in the other language they speak, not because the 
memories are fully constituted by the language, but because the different lan- 
guages are indexed to the memories in different ways. Such a finding seems to 
me to be ripe for being molded into support for two Vygotskyan claims: lan- 
guage plays a role in on-line thinking, and the history of behavior helps explain 
current behavior. Moreover, this finding can also be recast into computable form 
through some sort of propositional or schema-theoretic representation and histo- 
rical-linguistic indexing on its retrievability. Vygotsky now begins to make com- 
putable sense. 
For me to believe that mind is historical, you have to show me how history 
is actually used by people in their mental activities -not as a mere backdrop to 
thought, but as an element of computable mind. A lot is part of the influential 
backdrop to thought- the surface of Mars, my mother's illness, Poland's wars. 
But saying that historical events have a bearing on mind is not the same thing as 
saying that mind uses them or that mind must make reference to them to work. 
How does mind use such things? It can use them only in computable form. 
History and society, too, must be computed. All accounts of mind, as far as I can 
see, are computational. Classical symbol processing, connectionism, dynarnic 
cognition, situated cognition, schemas, scripts, frames, quantum computing, etc. 
-these are all computation. That is not to say that they are explicitly computatio- 
nal themselves: only that their claims must be phrasable in ultimately computa- 
ble terms. Nor is it to say that mind is a computer. All computers compute, but 
not all computing needs a computer. Computation is the execution offunctions 
over representational states, and this process can be implemented in a wide 
range of material, but material is needed. Even the irrepressible Gibsonian the- 
ory of affordances, where shallow minds run around in a rich world that does 
most of the work for them, has to have computable uptake: affordances for 
whom? for what? in what forn do they afford anybody anything? Computation 
may be shallow, minimal, probabilistic, associationistic, or whatever -but com- 
putation it nonetheless is. Social mind is a computational state. 
Another way to say all this is that psychology is about mind, and mind is 
what brains do when they compute. (So I reject Rosa's claim that I am a dualist.) 
Society is not what brains do. Only a thought-society is what brains do. 
I now see, as I hinted in my book and stand corrected by many of the com- 
mentators, that sociocomputationalism is principally a claim about cognitive 
science -or  that cognitive science wins more than Vygotsky in this competition. 
This is true, and it happens because cognitive science is to thinking as what evo- 
lutionary theory is to biology -the unifying metatheory that allows all other 
claims to make sense. A theory about social mind, as well as one about emotion, 
culture, or mathematical thinking, must comport with cognitive science to be be- 
lievable and testable, in the same way that biological claims are sensible only 
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against the backdrop of evolution or physical claims sensible against a theory of 
cosmology. Consequently, when some commentators suggest that I am talking 
about Vygotsky and cognitive psychology, this is a serious misunderstanding. 
Cognitive science is the metatheory of all mind science, including cognitive psy- 
chology, which itself has to be made compatible with cognitive science. There 
remains to be written an interesting book called How Cognitive Psychology is 
and is not Cognitive Science. Just like Vygotskyan socio-historical cultural psy- 
chology, cognitive psychology is a branch of cognitive science and must also be 
computational. 
So, indeed, Vygotskyanism and all proposals about mind have to be made 
computational to be sensible as descriptions or explanations. This leads to the 
claim that I am really siding with computation over social. I concede the point: I 
think this is true in a metatheoretical sense. And perhaps a better title for my 
book would have been: Vygotsky in Cognitive Science: How One Venion of So- 
ciocultural Psychology Can Reach Explanatory Adequacy. 
My ultimate computational leanings also lead to various commentators to 
suggest, as counterpoints, that some aspects of mind are not amenable to com- 
putationalism. Various responses invoke dynamism and call for flexibility and 
emergence. Vygotsky is added to this mix in two ways. One is to say that because 
Vygotskyanism involves dynamic cognition, it can't be computational; the other 
is to say that if Vygotskyanism is at all computational, it must be through con- 
nectionism or some other dynamic model, not the kind of symbolic computation 
I advocate (where control makes sense). I think both these strategies are inco- 
rrect. 
Here is an idea that I hear in a variety of forms and which I consider pa- 
tently false: 
Thinking is dynamic through and through, with the mind in constant update and ad- 
justment to input and its own mental loops. This intrinsic dynamism means that mind 
has no, or a very limited, fixed base and so there can be no computational theory of 
mind in the long run. Dynamism and emergence exclude the fixity of classical com- 
putation. Vygotsky fits in as a counter to fixity theorists because of his dynarnism: so- 
cial mind is in constant update, etc., etc. 
I don't believe this at all (nor did Vygotsky, as far as I can see, since he ad- 
vocated at least three levels of mind, the lowest quite elemental and <<fixed>>). The 
dynamist's complaint is a sort of existential denial of computation, occasionally 
bolstered by a false grasp of quantum computing (where all is supposed to be in 
flux: show me how we get stable beliefs about society from an unstable, quanti- 
zed, material substrate, and then 1'11 begin to believe such claims). If thinking is 
totally dynamic, then there are only individual instances of thinking. Conse- 
quently all our clairns about regularity and expectation and all Vygotskyan obser- 
vations about the predictability of social semiotic supports to thinking go out the 
window. There can be no science of one-time events and hence no science of 
mind built on complete dynamism. I recall hearing at an international socio-cul- I 
tural conference the claim that even genetic disorders are variable and socially 
constructed. What an irresponsible proposa1 driven by ideology alone! Tell that to 
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the parent who of a child with Fragile-X Syndrome: fix the society and we'll fix 
the genetics? If social mind is radically uncertain, and things like seK emotion, 
and person are therefore not amenable to precise computational formulation, then 
we are left with ethnographies and individual histories. If this is what a comrnit- 
ment to dynamism gets us, then responsible thinkers must opt out. 
It seems to me that history is made up by people in a regular way and, 
along with a society, is a stable semiotic support developed by humans as a re- 
source and taken up in the representational devices inside the head (probably dri- 
ven in large part by language). This is an efficient way to do mind business. How 
inefficient to reinvent the rules every time you think! Neither nature nor humans 
make things again and again, but establish some fixity on which subsequent 
things are made: mind has a stable substrate, admitted by even in the most dyna- 
mic radical connectionism (read closely the first part of the supposed counter- 
culture articles of faith: Rethinking Innateness). The most dynamic mind has 
computation. This is because you can't have mind without matter, and the way 
the matter of mind works is through organized computational states. 
Here is another idea that I hear in a variety of forms that I also consider pa- 
tently false: 
If Vygotsky is to be made computational, then connectionism is the only way to do it. 
This is because connectionist models are the most brain-like, are non-deterministic, 
and adapt easily to the outside world. If not connectionism, then some form of dyna- 
mic systems modeling is best. 
Maybe. For one thing, it is not at all clear that connectionism is a realistic 
rendering of mind-brain processes: no brain executes back propagation, e.g. For 
another, there are certain essential mental phenomena, such as variables, that a 
neural net cannot represent (Marcus 2001). So if Vygotsky comes to rest in cog- 
nitive science via connectionism alone, then we need to think harder about Vy- 
gotsky's computability. Let me give you an example. 
For inner speech to be a part of mind, it must be abstract and constituted 
in some sense by variables. That is one of the advantages of Vygotsky's obser- 
vation that inner speech is predicative: it has a logical form that allows it not to 
be reinvented with every instance of problem solving; inner speech is a resource 
that a mind is equipped with and that can be called up in on-line thinking. For 
this reason, as I have said in many places, the forms that surface in private spe- 
ech are always logical predicates, never functors. Thinkers in the act never say to 
themselves: the, the, the, but red, blue, go, etc. As a computable function in run- 
ning mind, inner speech uses predicates, which are variables. That is, the mind 
says to itself: it is one of those! Mind makes types. Unless connectionism can 
handle variables, it cannot handle inner speech. Marcus (2001) convinces me 
that connectionism cannot handle variables. Therefore, because an essential fea- 
ture of Vygotskyanism requires variables - the predicative structure of inner spe- 
ech -the best cognitive science for Vygotskyanism is one that has mind as a sym- 
bolic computing device. Indeed, variables are a way of capturing fixity and 
dynamism at the same time, which to me what Vygotsky (and Wittgenstein) 
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all about: how can dynamic, socially connected, individual mind run on an abs- 
tract base of stable resources? 
Other Sociocomputationalisms 
A number of commentators offer ways other than what I have proposed 
to bring social mind and, presumably, Vygotsky along with it, into computation. 
These proposals advance potentially computable or formal-like theories, such 
as mental models, situations, schemas, and executive control, as alternative and 
rather well-developed varieties of sociocomputationalism that complement or 
substitute for my brand of Vygotskyanism (see, e.g., Siguan, Rodrigo, Do- 
mingo, and Gomila). I agree mostly with these proposals, but find them ortho- 
gona1 to my main point. 
Let me repeat that my goa1 in Vygotsky and Cognitive Science was to take 
what I believe to be classical Vygotskyanism and show its computational viabi- 
lity. The view of Vygotsky I am working with is as follows: 
In the course of human development, social dialogic speech, which is the principal re- 
flection of externa1 semiotic supports to thought, is reduced and goes underground as 
monologic inner speech, intertwining with thinking (hence ccspeaking and thinking,,). 
Social speech then surfaces wherever semiotic support for thinking is needed -e.g., in 
difficult on-line tasks- as private speech. The origins and course of this speech-mind 
development are a unique feature of Vygotskyanism. Humans are born social and must 
learn to use the speech of others as a resource and means for them to individuate into 
self-regulated thinkers. Linguistic relativity and cognitive variability, the unique so- 
cially-thinking person, the effects of history on individual thought -these are all bound 
up with and secondary to the process of the ccspeechification>> of thinking. 
There are certainly social structures that humans represent in their com- 
putational minds as schemas and scripts. But how does speaking connect to 
these? How are these semiotic supports translated into speech for thinking? To 
me, these are the specifically Vygotskyan questions. 
There are certainly mentally represented social situations that can be com- 
puted as propositions or image schemas. Wertsch's wonderful, detailed microa- 
nalyses reveal how different situation definitions determine courses of behavior. 
How does the language of the situation -perhaps determined by the different lan- 
guages in which the situation is enacted- drive (perhaps differentially) the regu- 
latory mechanisms that allow an individual to successfully complete a task, from 
others' help to solo performance? These are Vygotskyan questions. 
There are certainly mental models, ordinary logical models serving pro- 
blem solving and reflecting contingencies of the social environment more than 
classical logic. Are these driven by the way social speech might pose or frame 
elements of a mental model? I tried to answer some of these questions in the 
book with an examination of mathematical problem solving. 
There is certainly executive control, which may or may not be social and 
in any case covers a variety of functions, as I outline in the book. What role does 
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self-directed speech and the form of language play in executive control? I have 
some potential answers below, but I want to underscore that the mere presence 
of executive control does not thereby elicit Vygotskyanism. That brand of socio- 
computationalism has, to me, quite specific questions and answers. 
In my view, other sociocomputationalisms can proceed with no genuine 
use of Vygotsky (and, in my view, they have frequently used Vygotsky in per- 
functory ways). To resonate with my proposals and be true sociocomputational 
alternatives, they must at least acknowledge the uniqueness and specificity of 
classical Vygotskyanism in order not to be simply one other variety of the proli- 
ferating theories of social rnind. Unless there is such direct contact, using Vy- 
gotsky therein makes him look like everyone else who has made the claim that 
social facts bear on thought. How could that claim be anything other than true? 
He thus comes to look very much like Piaget, who I think is just wrong anyway 
in his cognitive theory (see below) and quite at odds with Vygotsky on some cru- 
cial points about social thought and language. 
Vygotsky's experiments showed that children do not move from indivi- 
dual to social at the level of higher thought and as they become socialized and 
homogenized into all others, but instead use their social origins and social spe- 
ech privately as a means to individuate from a social group. For Piaget, you be- 
come socialized as you learn the social structures all around you (a logical claim, 
it seems to me, but incorrect empirically); for Vygotsky, you are born social and 
have to learn to be an individual by using the social semiotic means around you. 
These are not the same view: Vygotskyan sociocomputationalism must provide 
mechanisms whereby social speech can be translated into the interna1 semiotic 
supports for individuals as they differentiate from the social group and engage in 
self-regulated behavior. Such a view requires a computable speech for thought. 
How does social speech go underground and drive metathought? Is there an in- 
ternal landing site for the externa1 through social speech, gone silent, as a gui- 
ding force? Vygotsky and Cognitive Science was all about these questions. 
Exclusions and oversights 
A number of cornrnentators indicate that, by their reading, my brand of 
computationalism excludes or overlooks certain critica1 interactions of the social 
world and thinking, thus impoverishing my overall argument. This criticism sur- 
faces in many places in the responses of Domingo, Rosa, Siguan, Lacasa, Go- 
mila, and, to a certain extent, Silvestri. One such exclusion is culture. Some think 
that I have not appreciated culture in its fullest extent in proposing a computa- 
tionalization of Vygotskyan socio-cultural mind. To this, my response is similar 
to that given to those who are concerned about my commitment to history. 
We must be vigilant in differentiating culture from mere environment. 
Culture may be a tabulation of legitimate behavior and the evaluation of beha- 
vior, a kind of cosmological handbook for individuals who share a certain time 
and space. But unless the handbook is cognized, and unless it can be cognized in 
computational forns, culture has no bearing on thinking. Similarly, cultural des- 
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cription per se is a phenomenology, not a contribution to the explanation of 
thinking. For there to be a meaningful and useful relation between culture and thin- 
king both in tems of the individual and context and the explanation of individual 
thinking in a cultural context, culture must have mental uptake, In short, culture re- 
quires cognitive science. 
Furthennore, and more apposite to Vygotskyan cultural psycholinguistics, 
unless culture can be shown to be bound up with language, speech, and other se- 
miotic resources with demonstrable cognitive influence, then accounts of cultu- 
ral phenomena, no mater how interesting or potentially cognitive, remain out- 
side classical Vygotskyanism. How do semiotic cultural supports get translated 
into speech for self-directed and other directed action in online thinking? That is 
a Vygotskyan question, which would differentiate Vygotskyan sociocultural psy- 
chology from mere cultural psychology. 
It is well known that different cultures have different ways of organizing 
mathematical entities and of calculating, often combining mathematical ideas 
with other indigenous theories of divination, estimation, time, and social rela- 
tionships. These cultures' mathematical systems can be shown to be entirely for- 
mal at base -universal and logical, transcultural- and computable; they reveal ge- 
nuine mathematical perspicacity and insight in the minds of their users (see 
Ascher 2002). Moreover, it appears that the social context of mathematics and the 
use of public calculation allow these mathematical ideas to influence group and 
individual cognition, as in the case of public divination. Thus it appears that indi- 
genous mathematics (is calculus an indigenous mathematics?) is used by minds 
with explicit semiotic support (e.g., props and special speech) in on-line problem 
solving as individuals and groups interact. Hence, the study of indigenous mathe- 
matics is a place for Vygotskyan socio-cultural computationalism. I do not exa- 
mine such a process in my book, apart from looking at the role of speech in Wes- 
tern mathematical problem solving, but indeed such study of ethnomathematics is 
entirely appropriate for Vygotskyan theory under cognitive science. That is one 
way for culture to come into my proposals more than it may have. 
A second area where there is some concern that I have excluded informa- 
tion is in language itself. My reading of these cornmentaries is that some think 
that I have overlooked the fact that language <<really>> is a pragmatic, communi- 
cation system. Thus, linguistic analysis in the service of on-line thinking is prin- 
cipally an elaborated pragmatic analysis of such things as pronouns and other 
context markers. To a lirnited extent, I agree with this. There is no question that 
the pragmatic resources of a language are part of the way that speech for thin- 
king comes about. But what I am proposing is something both more and less 
than sheer pragmatic analysis. If private speech is a marker of cognitive-compu- 
tational control, then languages -by their form- give their speakers certain struc- 
tures that foster and manage the interaction of the social and the cognitive-com- 
putational. These forms are not coterminous with the set of pragmatic markers, 
nor do they exclude semantics or syntax, or even semantically empty forms 
(since words, the workhorse of Vygotskyan linguistic mind, may have phonetic 
fonn but no meaning: see Jackendoff, 1997). Indeed, I think that there needs to 
be a new kind of socio-cognitive linguistic study that identifies, analyzes and ex- 
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plains the forms that individuals may marshal as cognitive control devices in on- 
line thinking. Such a study is neither pragmatics nor semantics. 
Let me try to give an example. Carmthers (2002) has argued, correctly, I 
think, that language is the means by which mental modules talks to each other; 
language, in particular logical form, is the medium of cross-domain cognition 
and central processing because of its propositional explicitness. I believe that 
this is also one way to talk about inner speech. If Carruthers is right, then lan- 
guages must differ in how they offer their speakers ths  cross-module, represen- 
tational explicitness because they also differ in logical fom: ChineseIEnglish di- 
vergences in scope and logical markers are well known examples. How, then do 
differences in logical form -which is not semantic or pragmatic, but syntactic- 
translate into differences in the delivery of information across mental modules in 
on-line thought? This strikes me as a remarkably Vygotskyan research question, 
one that accepts (probably much to the horror of believers) Chomskyan linguis- 
tics as a correct theory of language. So, to me, much work needs to be done on 
the forms of language that can mediate culture and thought. I started some of this 
analysis in the book, but there is much more to do. 
A third area where it is suggested I overlooked important interactions bet- 
ween culture and language is emotion. I agree that I did not say anything about 
emotions in Vygotsky and Cognitive Science -I knew so little about them then! 
In the interim, however, I have begun work on the cognitive-computational 
structure of emotions (Frawley and Smith, 2001). 
Like history and social knowledge, emotions are contextual, individual, and 
subject to situational variation. Thus, they are excellent candidates for examination 
by varieties of cultural psychology. Whether Vygotskyan cultural psychology is the 
correct such variety is not clear. Do emotions play a role in the serniotic life of the 
mind and in the interaction of individual minds with the representational context? 
I think the answer to the first is yes, probably obviously so. Affective disorders, 
e.g., are typically diagnosed by an individual's failure to read and evince the public 
cues of emotions. Thus there seems to be something about emotions that perches 
them on the serniotic bridge between mental architecture and context and makes 
them good prospects for cultural psychology. But to get more Vygotskyan: do 
emotions rely on speech for thinking in same way that problem solving does, or, if 
Carruthers (2002) is right, as the way central inferencing does? I think the answer 
to these questions is: we don't know, but it is unlikely. Language and emotions ob- 
viously interact -you have to talk about what you feel, and emotions are almost 
certainly computable, especially in their ahigh road>> forn (LeDoux's 1996 tem), 
where they affect cognition and metacognition. But whether emotions are also in- 
trinsically linguistic in any way is unclear to me. Certainly languages represent 
emotions in different, culturally specific ways, but, as far as I know, speaking, does 
not seem to be essentially implicated in feeling. Indeed, the claim that emotions re- 
quire speech is doubtful to me (unlike the self, which, to me, does need self-direc- 
ted social speech and is obviously different from emotions since self and feeling 
can be neurally and cognitively dissociated). That is, you don't have to speak to 
feel in the same way that may have to speak to deploy higher thinking to solve pro- 
blems and to know that you are a self. 
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So, I am in agreement with my commentators that emotions are social and 
cultural in some way, are the proper object of cultural psychology, and are in- 
deed an essential part of sociocomputational mind. But are they linguistically or 
semiotically mediated? That needs to be answered in the affirmative before they 
can be brought into Vygotskyan sociocomputationalism, in my view. 
Misreading the background 
A final set of clarification lies in claims by commentators that I have mis- 
read the background material to my arguments, often in a critically incorrect 
way. Consequently, severa1 commentators suggest that my arguments rnight be 
foundationally flawed, resting on a mistake: e.g., that I misperceive the unities in 
Wittgenstein and overlook his functionalism; that I cannot be a unification theo- 
rist and embrace Derrida; that I have bypassed all the correspondences between 
Vygotsky and Piaget. These claims, in one form or another, surfaces in the res- 
ponses of Rosa, Lacasa, Domingo, Madruga. I wish to respond only very briefly 
to these objections. 
First, let me turn to Wittgenstein. I believe that a careful reading of Wittgens- 
tein shows many continuities between the earlier Wittgenstein and the later one. I 
have described those in Vygotsky and Cognitive Science (pp. 50-57 in the English 
version) with ample citation from the texts and critics. The glaring misperception of 
the later Wittgenstein that has permeated the literature and repeated erroneously is 
that he was a thoroughgoing functionalist, converting totally from a logician into a 
social meaning theorist and disavowing his wrongheaded past. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. The crucial passage in the Investigations reads: <<For a large 
class of cases -though not for all- in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be 
defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language,, (20, #43). As I have 
said, Wittgenstein advances a social theory, not of words, but of the meaning of 
meaning, and this theory neither disrnisses nor is incompatible with ostension, nor 
does it cover every instance of meaning. It is this residual aspect of meaning that 
gives continuity between the early and late Wittgenstein. To read his crucial state- 
ment otherwise is to be irresponsible. There is truth other than functional truth, and 
that is one continuity across the two Wittgensteins. The same non-functional basis 
can be found in Vygotsky, who advocates three levels of thinking, with the highest 
as sociocultural and functional but built on a constant substrate. Neither thought nor 
meaning is social all the way down. 
Second, let me remark on Piaget. Vygotsky and Piaget agreed on much -that 
is for sure. After all, Piaget is a logical theorist of development, not an empirical 
one -since empirical work shows much of what he said was wrong (Baillargeon, 
1995, e.g.). So, if Piaget was at all right on anything, they had to agree on some 
things about the necessities of development. What could be more self-evident than 
the fact that children become socialized, they learn conjunctions before causes, 
they have to be cognitively ready to acquire certain speech forms, their biological 
maturation affects their cognitive structures, and they have to learn abstract opera- 
tions as they unlearn concrete perceptual ones? To me, a lot is wrong with this. For 
Anuario de Psicologia, vol. 34, no 4, diciembre 2003, pp. 449-503 
O 2003, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat de Psicologia 
Why I am (still) a sociocomputationalist and why you should be, too! 501 
one thing, some of this alogicn is just wrong: children's language runs a path in- 
dependent of their cognition (they speak about abstract complex causes well be- 
fore they ever pass Piagetian tests of causal cognition: Pinker, 1994) and many 
have shown that the cognitive operations of Piaget's stages of development are pre- 
sent at birth and do not mature from exposure (again see the work of Baillargeon). 
For another, Vygotsky and Piaget disagreed strongly on the role of language and 
social context in mental development. As I have said in many places, when it co- 
mes to higher thought (metaconsciousness), Vygotsky believed that children are 
born social and have to learn to be individuals through the use of self-directed so- 
cial speech that has been truncated into speech for thinking. This is the opposite of 
what Piaget claimed. The crucial test lies in egocentric speech, which, Vygotsky 
observed, is never lost, but surfaces as a support for higher thought in individuals 
in difficult situations and develops as an individual means of thinking when speech 
and thinking intertwine. Thus, children's higher thought via speech is initially in- 
dividual only in social contexts (when they speak to themselves in the presence of 
others) and then becomes social in individual contexts (when they speak to them- 
selves in social speech when they are alone). This is not Piaget's theory at all. 
Have I misread Piaget, not used him enough? Why is there not more Pia- 
get in Vygotsky and Cognitive Science? It is because Piaget is wrong in funda- 
mental ways about what thinking is and how it develops, and he is certainly not 
at all in agreement with Vygotsky on what I take to be the core of classical Vy- 
gotskyanism -the role of speech in embodying and executing relevant social 
context in the development of higher thought. 
Finally, there is Derrida. A number of cornrnentators, Madruga in particu- 
lar, observe the paradox in promoting a unified theory of mind that uses decons- 
truction, which gets its power from the absence of synthesis. I agree with this cri- 
ticism, and acknowledge that I probably suggested too strongly that using 
Derrida to interrogate Wittgenstein led to a coherent theory of mind. I think, ho- 
wever, that there is a difference between an integrated theory of mind, where dif- 
ferences are lost (contra deconstruction), and a unified theory of mind, where 
differences are maintained in productive tension. I was hoping to promote the 
latter. I see Wittgenstein as I see mind: a constellation of discrete modules, not a 
synthesis. I think both Wittgenstein #I and Wittgenstein #2 existed in productive 
tension in a single Wittgenstein; likewise, both socio-functional mind and deter- 
ministic mental computation exist in productive difference: in a unity, but not an 
integration. The failure on my part was not to push Vygotsky's Marxism enough 
to allow Hegelian synthesis vs. the Derridean play of opposites. I do not yet 
know how to work this out, and think it may not be possible. But I do not think 
this shortfall undermines the argument fatally. In the end, my cornrnitment to 
unity of competing opposites over integration is why I advocated a step back 
from a grand scheme theory of mind at the end of the book. 
Aspects of a Future Vygotskyan Cognitive Science 
Now that I have tried to respond to my critics and cornmentators, I want to 
briefly sketch out some directions for a future Vygotskyan cognitive science, 
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built at I think it must be on sociocomputationalism. The first area of promise is 
working memory. In my reading of the views of Carruthers (2002), surnmarized 
in Frawley (2002c), Carruthers argues that two formal aspects of language -Lo- 
gical Form (LF) and Phonetic Form (PF)- are the means by which representations 
from non-linguistic modules are made explicit so as to serve cross-domain men- 
tal processing and inference (see also Frawley, 2002a, 2002b). Hence, these 
forms of speech serve on-line thinking, and we might thus see Vygotsky's es- 
sentia1 claim about speech for thinking as a claim about the form of language in 
working memory. It is well known that acoustic and articulatory codes are acti- 
vated in working memory, and if we can also see inner speech as something like 
the deployment of phonetic form as the means of inter-modular processing, then 
we ought to get specific effects of speech on the disruption of non-linguistic 
tasks in working memory. That is, inner speech ought to be disruptable in non- 
linguistic on-line tasks. Baddeley's (1999, pp. 50-51) observation that recall of 
visually presented numbers can be disrupted by linguistic input is perhaps evi- 
dence for this cognitivizing of the classical Vygotskyan position. Moreover, as 
Baddeley (1999) observes, when individuals suppress speech, they have pro- 
blems transferring visual material to short-term phonological store, which im- 
plicates the involvement of speech in domain-crossing. I would hope that detai- 
led experimental work on this subject would reveal more about the role of 
phonetic and logical form, and their integration in a Vygotskyan theory of com- 
putational working memory. 
A second area of promise is a renewed exarnination of linguistic relativity. 
Logical and phonetic forms, even in formal theories, have known patterns of va- 
riation. If these aspects of language are the way that speech is translated into a 
vehicle for higher thought in working memory, then variation in the form would 
result in variations in the instruments of on-line thinking. Is this another, socio- 
computational way of talking about linguistic relativity? Do languages differ in 
the way their formal structures provide the working memories of their speakers 
alternate formats for silent predication (LF) and informational ordering (PF)? 
Baddeley (1999, p. 53) observes that the articulatory loop in working memory is 
an effective monitor for informational order of information, and measures of 
working memory have been claimed to be a more accurate measure of individua1 
variation and performance than IQ. Does a renewed sociocomputational Vy- 
gotskyanism also renew linguistic relativity as a claim about how languages of- 
fer their users alternate means for silent and self-directed linguistic explicitness 
as they think in real time? 
A third area of promise has to do with evolutionary psychology. Much has 
been said recently about the resurgence and relevance of evolutionary theories of 
cognition (Pinker, 1997, 2002). It seems to me that sociocomputationalism and 
Vygotskyan cognitive science have a significant role to play in the latest evolu- 
tionary explanations of the human mind. Current theories of human development 
trace the emergence of cognition to the brain structures that support and check 
social relations, tie speech to exapted motor prograrns, and identify expanded 
neural development for cross-module information flow and executive monito- 
ring (Deacon, 1997; Dunbar, 1996; de Waal, 2002; Sober and Wilson, 1999). I 
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see Vygotsky as a natural partner in all this theorizing. Could it be that one thing 
that makes us human is that we have evolved speech into thinking? Could it be 
that humans have evolved an elaborate working memory buffer (Bownds, 1999) 
that is sustained and in some sense constituted by social speech reduced to silent 
predication which, by its form, serves cross-domain thinking because it is a good 
way to make information explicit and so serve higher thought as it monitors real 
time thinking? 
I find these questions intriguing because, if the answers to them are yes, 
then it means that Vygotsky is the future of cognitive science and computationa- 
lism (not the other way around, as some of my cornmentators insist). A fully in- 
formed evolutionary psychology -i.e., a theory of what makes humans human- 
must appreciate classical Vygotskyanism as translated into cognitive science. 
That is why I am still a sociocomputationalist, and why I think you should be, too. 
Ascher, M. (2002). Mathematics elsewhere. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Baddeley, A. (1999). Essetztials ofhuman memory. East Sussex: Psychology Press. 
Baillargeon, R. (1995). Physical reasoning in infancy. In M. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences 
(pp. 181-204). Cambridge: MU Press. 
Bownds, M. (1999). The biology of mind: Origitzs and structures of mind, brain, and consciousness. Bethesda, 
MD: Fitzgerald Science Press. 
Carruthers, P. (2002). The cognitive functions of language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25,657-74. 
Deacon, T. (1997). The synzbolic species: The co-evolutiotz of language and the brain. New York: Norton. 
De Waal, F. (Ed.) (2001). Tree of origin: Whatprimate behavior can tell us about human social evolution. Cam- 
bridge: Harvard University Press. 
Dunbar, R. (1996). Grooming, gossip, and the evolution of language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
Frawley, W. (2002a). Control and cross-domain mental computation: Evidence from language breakdown. 
Cottzputational Itztelligence, 18, 1-28. 
Frawley, W. (2002b). Mental computation and language breakdown: Clarifications, extensions, and responses: 
Evidence from language breakdown. Computational Intelligence, 18,59-86. 
Frawley, W. (2002~). Inner speech and the meeting o€ the minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25,686-87. 
Frawley, W. and Smith, R. N.(2001). A processing theory of alexithymia. Journal of Cognitive Systems Re- 
search, 2, 189-206. 
Jackendoff. R. (1997). The architecture of the language faculty. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
LeDoux, J. (1996). The emotional brain. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Marcus, G. (2001). The algebraic mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Pinker, S. (1994). The language instinct. New York: Morrow. 
Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. New York: Norton. 
Pinker, S. (2002). The blank slate: The modern denial of human nature. New York: Viking Penguin. 
Sober, E. and Wilson, D. (1 999). Unto others: The evolution andpsychology of unselfish behavior. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Vygotsky, L.S. (1986). Thought and language (revised edition). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Attuario de Psicologia, vol. 34, no 4, diciembre 2003,449-503 
O 2003, Universitat de Barcelona, Facultat de Psicologia 

Aiuiario de Psicologia 
2003, vol. 34, no 4,505-571 
O 2003, Facultat de Psicologia 
Universitat de Barcelona 
Significado e implicaciones de una teoría: 
a vueltas con la modu1arida.d de la mente 
Tal como decíamos en la presentación general de este volumen, la dis- 
cusión de las ideas de J. Fodor de la constitución modular de la mente se ha 
avivado en 10s últimos aíios. No hay duda de que la teoria ha tenido un im- 
pacto formidable y duradero en el ámbito de la psicologia cognitiva, y sigue 
teniéndolo. Ha logrado además la dificil virtud de funcionar como referente 
teórico en dos niveles rnuy distintos y nada fáciles de conjugar -y, por ello, 
poco comunes: el d i rnamente  general que representa el jomular una teoría 
de la arquitectura mental o del fondo estructural y fundamental del sistema y 
funcionamiento cognitivo, y, a la vez, el constituir una&ente de hipótesis mu- 
cho más especljCicas para la prospección e interpretación de datos empíricos 
en áreas de investigación precisas y restringidas. Ahora bien, precisamente 
por ocupar simultáneamente un lugar a la vez central y múltiplemente local en 
el panorama de la investigación cognitiva, ha ido teniendo que lidiar con mil- 
tiples y poderosos antagonistas teóricos. En 10s comentarios que a continua- 
ción se ofrecen se hace patente esto que decimos. Los frentes de discusión son 
muchos, la posibilidad de síntesisfinal ... o rnuy complicada en estos momentos 
o sencillamente prematura. Pero si las teorías valen por su capacidad de pro- 
rnover investigación y discusión, la de la modularidad constituye un valor se- 
guro. Y su discusión proporciona un cierto retrato de muchas de las preocu- 
paciones e incertidumbres que la investigación cognitiva viene deparando. 
Palabras clave: J. Fodor, mente modular, modularidad msiva ,  inna- 
tisrno. 
As we mentioned in the introduction to this volume, the debate surroun- 
dirzg Fodor's ideas on the modular constitution of mind has experienced a re- 
viva1 in recent years. The impact of Fodor's theory in the ambit of cognitive 
psychology is still felt today. Furthermore, it has managed to serve as a theo- 
retical reference point at two very different, almost incompatible levels: at the 
highly general level, aiding the formulation of a theory of the mental architec- 
ture or the structural and fundamental background of the system and cognitive 
functioning; and at a more detailed level, constituting a source for much more 
specific hypotheses for the exploration and interpretation of empirical data in 
specific, circurnscribed research fields. However, precisely because it holds 
both a centralposition and a multitude of more specific ones in thefield ofcog- 
nitive research, it has had to,face numerous and powerjid theoretical challen- 
ges, as the following comments repect. The arens jor discussion are many, the 
possibility of an eventual synthesis too complicated or simply premature. But 
if the value of a theory lies in its capacity for promoting research and discus- 
sion, then the position of the rnodularity theory seems assured. Its discussion 
sheds light on muny of the concerns and uncertainties present in the field of 
cognitive research. 
Key words: J. Fodor, modular mind, massive modularity, innatism. 
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Fodor y la modularidad de la mente 
(veinte años después) 
José E. Garcia-Albea 
Universidad Rovira i Virgili 
En el amplio panorama bibliogrS~co de las ciencias cognitivas, es difícil 
encontrar una obra que haya sido mis citada, comentada y discutida que el libro 
The Modularity of Mind (en adelante, MM), publicado por Jerry Fodor en 1983 
(con traducción española de 1986). Detenerse a examinar el impacto de MM en es- 
tos veinte años conduce, de forma casi inevitable, a hacer un balance de 10 que ha 
sido la propia investigación cognitiva durante este Último periodo. Dicha tarea, re- 
alizada con la extensión y el rigor apropiados, desbordaria con inucho 10s limites 
sugeridos para este comentaria. Me conformaré, por ello, con atender a un par de 
aspectos que me parecen importantes. En primer lugar, me interesa destacar el lu- 
gar que ha ocupado MM en la obra de Fodor, y cóm0 se conecta la idea de modu- 
laridad con otras facetas de la visión fodoriana de la mente cognitiva. En segundo 
lugar, y mirando mis hacia el futuro, trataré de mostrar hasta qué punto se puede 
seguir considerando MM como un programa abierto de investigación y cuáles son 
algunas de las principales cuestiones pendientes de solución. 
Una mirada hacia el pasado: la modularidad en contexto 
Cuando se publicó MM hace veinte años, hacia veinte años que Jerry Fo- 
dor se habia incorporado al MIT y, atraído por el trabajo de Noam Chomsky, par- 
ticipaba de forma destacada en el cambio paradigmático que se estaba produ- 
ciendo más o menos simultáneamente en la lingüística, la psicologia y la 
filosofia de la mente. La convergencia de intereses de estas disciplinas; junto 
con las aportaciones de las ciencias de la computación y de la neurociencia, 
contribuirian a configurar el ámbito interdisciplinar de la ciencia cognitiva. En 
este clima innovador, Fodor desarrolla una amplia labor en varios frentes: la re- 
flexión filosófica sobre el nivel p rop i~  de la explicación psicológica ante 10s in- 
tentos reduccionistas; la reivindicación de la psicologia del sentido común y las 
actitudes proposicionales; sus primeras aproximaciones al problema del signi- 
ficado, en el contexto de las relaciones entre pensamiento y lenguaje; la funda- 
mentación y desarrollo de la hipótesis del lenguaje del pensamiento (mentalés), 
pieza clave de la teoria representacional/computacional (RIC) de la mente; y, ya 
en el campo de la investigación empírica, la puesta en marcha de un amplio pro- 
grama de psicolingüistica experimental, referencia obligada para entender 10s 
desarrollos posteriores de este campo de estudio en el marco de la psicologia 
cognitiva y la lingüística generativa. 
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